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SCHLICHER'S "MOODS OF INDIRECT QUOTATION"

Schlicher's view (see reference above) is hard to state because it appears to be not wholly consistent with itself as concerns the exact force of the Subjunctive idiom. But the attempt may be made as follows:

Light is to be had upon the origin of the Optative or Subjunctive constructions of indirect discourse by comparison of the usages in Latin, Greek, and Germanic. The problem is to discover the original independent construction from which the dependent one arose. This is lacking in Greek, but may be made out in German and Latin. It is the Subjunctive that *rejects* a command or statement, as in Plaut. *Bacch.* 627a: *Non taces, insipiens?* (answered by) *Taceam?* A rival idea exists in the mind of the speaker B, who is replying to a former speaker A; and this idea serves as an obstacle to the acceptance of A's idea by B. The Indicative, on the other hand, in the cases of direct discourse next related, shows (p. 78) that "B's attitude toward A's idea is *receptive*, and that his mind is on the road to acceptance, so far as it has gone," as in Plaut. *Bacch.* 680: *MN. Quia patri omne cum ramento reddidi. CH. Reddidisti? MN. Reddidi.* "The two constructions therefore clearly stand in the same relation to each other as that which exists between the Subjunctive in indirect discourse, by which the speaker gives the idea as that of another, without accepting it or assuming any responsibility for it, and the Indicative in indirect discourse, by which the speaker expresses one of his own ideas, or the idea of another which he is himself willing to accept and treat as his own" (pp. 78, 79).

My criticism at this point is that the statement "stand in the same relation to each other" does not conform to the facts. The independent Subjunctive *rejects*, the construction of the O. O. which Schlicher seeks to connect with it does not, even by his own exposition, reject.

Schlicher might have made his doctrine apparently (not ultimately) more attractive by saying that in the Subjunctive idiom of O. O. we have a feeling which began with rejection, but ended in the mere feeling of foreignness. He does not do this. On the contrary he says in his final summary on p. 88 that "the presentation, for acceptance, of an idea that meets obstacles in his" (B's) "mind when he hears it, is, from his point of view, as much a demand upon his mental activities, as an order to climb a tree is a demand upon the muscles of his arms and legs." This means that B regards himself, where he uses the Subjunctive, as having an idea presented to him which comes into collision with an existing prior idea in his mind, and that it requires a very vigorous exertion of the will to accept it. Thus in the passage *B. G. i. 22: Considius dicit montem quem a Labieno occupari voluerit ab hostibus teneri*, Caesar the narrator, even after the considerable lapse of time before publication, finds that it requires an effort of his will, as real as the muscular

effort of tree-climbing, to accept Considius's statement that Caesar the general did really want the hill occupied. And what can the prior idea, existing as an obstacle in the mind of Caesar the narrator, have been, when, in the previous chapter, he expressly tells us that Caesar the general ordered this precise thing to be done (*Labienum . . . summum iugum montis ascendere iubet*)?

But the difference between the two conceivable forms of the doctrine is immaterial. At the *origin* of the Subjunctive construction of the O. O., in any event, the situation, on Schlicher's theory, must have been as he last states it; and this does not appear easily thinkable. It would mean, as Schlicher actually allows himself to say on p. 70, that the difference of the two moods was one of "discriminating between ideas as to their truthfulness," and would imply B's conviction (and B is anybody) that the psalmist was nearly right in saying, in his haste, that all men are liars. It would mean, even upon the most cheerful view, that the Subjunctive usage grew up at a time when a Roman's first instinct was to disbelieve everything his neighbor told him, down to the last subordinate clause. The doctrine, in short, seems to me excessively sublimated, and to have been constructed upon a dangerous method.

My second objection is on comparative grounds. I am glad, in view of the common disregard of such grounds, to see that Schlicher makes use of them; but I do not find that he does so with sufficient circumspection. The Latin repudiating question or exclamation is clearly of volitive origin, as Schlicher himself believes (see arrangement for Germanic on p. 84). Now the corresponding construction is *not* lacking in Greek, as he says, but exists, except that it does not go so far, i. e., does not go beyond the repudiation of a command, as in Aristoph. *Lys.* 530: ΔΥ. σῶπα. ΠΡ. σοί γ', ὦ κατάραε, σιωπῶ ἔγω;—a very close parallel to the Latin example quoted above. The mood is the Subjunctive. But the mood of the O. O. in Greek is the *Optative*. Hence the explanation which Schlicher gives for Latin will not fit the facts in Greek, and his main presupposition is destroyed, and his problem unsolved.

It is interesting to see how syntax repeats itself. Wüllner *Die Bedeutung der sprachlichen Casus und Modi* (1827) makes the Subjunctive of O. O. (p. 136) an expression of a former judgment now regarded as willed, and insisted upon ("etwas gesolltes"). This is identical with Schlicher's theory. Closely allied (and identical as regards the starting-point) is that of Dittmar *Studien zur lat. Moduslehre* (1897), pp. 204-8, though Schlicher probably was unaware of the fact in working out his doctrine. I regret Schlicher's apparent tendency, since I believe Dittmar's theory that the "polemical" Subjunctive is the source of all other Latin Subjunctives to be wholly erroneous.

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